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Introduction
Economic evaluation of health technologies, specifically cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), is commonly seen as a means of satisfying an explicit social objective subject to an exogenous budget constraint (Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al., 2005) . Within this "social decision making perspective", CEA cannot be used to make claims about social welfare or the optimality or otherwise of the budget for health care; its role is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions within the health care sector rather than prescribing social choice in general. It is this role that CEA has tended to play in policy and it fits well with the view Claxton et al., forthcoming) that decision making bodies such as NICE in the UK can be seen as the agent of a socially legitimate higher authority which is unable to express an explicit, complete and coherent social welfare function. These circumstances can be regarded as a hierarchy (Mookherjee, 2006) where the agent (NICE) acts as a delegated authority but one that cannot be asked to improve social welfare, since it cannot be specified by the principal. Rather, the principal allocates resources and gives the agent a responsibility to pursue explicit and specific objectives (such as maximising the present value of health). The implications of this process reveal a partial but socially legitimate expression of some unknown underlying latent social welfare function. For example, the budget allocated by the higher authority implies a particular cost-effectiveness threshold which is a revealed expression of how much society wishes to pay for improvements in health generated by collectively funded health care.
In these circumstances, appropriate decisions made by the agent based on cost-effectiveness evaluations of health care technologies depend upon the cost-effectiveness threshold, t k , in each period t , the growth rate of the cost-effectiveness threshold,
some social rate of time preference for health, h r (Claxton et al., in submission) .
1 For a technology with costs and effects in two time periods, a decision rule expressed in terms of discounted net health benefit is to accept the technology if: 
The discount rate applied to t h remains:
1 Such decisions also necessarily assume divisibility and constant returns (Birch and Gafni, 1993 
The cost-effectiveness threshold
The cost effectiveness threshold represents an estimate of health forgone as other health care activities are displaced within a budget constrained health care system to accommodate any additional costs of a technology approved by the agent (McCabe et al., 2008) . A national body, such as NICE, needs an estimate of what is expected to be forgone across the health care system in each period. This will change as circumstances are expected to change, tending to rise with increases in budget and health care costs but tending to fall with increases in productivity .
In each period the state of technology and the efficiency of the health care system as well as the prevailing prices of inputs can be regarded as fixed. In these circumstances it is reasonable to assume that health output, 
Figure 1. Health production and the threshold
This relationship between budget and health output in two periods is illustrated in Figure 1 . The threshold, t k , is the reciprocal of the slope at the point on the production function corresponding to the budget.
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Since the slope of the production function represents the "shadow price" of the budget (health gained for a marginal increase in budget), the threshold is the reciprocal of this shadow price.
In period t the prices of inputs and technology are fixed so t k will unambiguously increase with the budget, i.e. t k is greater at B 2 than at B 1 . However, whether or not t k increases over time will depend on changes in prices, technology as well as the budget. In Figure 1 ,
is drawn to represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, possibly due to innovation in health technology and medicine, greater efficiency in the delivery of health care services and/or a fall in the prices of particular inputs, e.g. due to the entry of generic drugs. In these circumstances, with a constant budget of B
The growth rate of the threshold is given by 1 ) (
Health output example, if any growth in the overall budget is spent on national initiatives or other activities that cannot or cannot easily be displaced by the agent"s decisions, then any additional costs of approved technologies must be accommodated by displacing other more effective activities elsewhere. If none of the additional budget is spent on activities that can be displaced then the threshold will remain constant (or fall with increased productivity). Therefore, it is growth in expenditure on more "discretionary" parts of the budget and changes in the productivity and input prices of those health care activities which more likely to be displaced which are most relevant.
The social time preference rate
The social rate of time preference for consumption, c r , often referred to simply as the social time preference rate (STPR), represents the proportionate increase in consumption required in period 1 t for society in period t to be indifferent between period t and period 1 t consumption. It is subject to an extensive literature (Ramsey, 1928; HM Treasury, 2003; Zhuang et al., 2007) , and is generally regarded as comprising of three elements: a catastrophic risk premium; a rate of pure time preference; and a third element which accounts for the diminishing marginal utility of future consumption when per capita consumption is expected to increase over time. Therefore, STPR represents social preferences over current and future consumption but the particular value of c r is also linked to production possibilities and the observed rates of return to capital.
Figure 2. Intertemporal choice and production
The social time preference for consumption and the possibilities of transforming current consumption into future consumption through investment returns are simply illustrated over two periods in Figure 2 . Social preferences for consumption between the two periods can be described by the dashed indifference curve which represents an intertemporal social welfare function (ISWF). The slope at any point on the ISWF is given by 1 c r and describes the rate at which society is willing to trade current for future consumption. However, which point on the ISWF society will chose to locate depends on the intertemporal production possibilities, i.e. how current consumption can be transformed into future consumption by forgoing current consumption which can be invested at a rate of return to provide future consumption opportunities. These production possibilities are described by
Consumption in period t+1 (C t+1 )
the intertemporal production possibility frontier (IPPF). The shape of the IPPF is determined by the marginal productivity of capital, which in this case exhibits markedly diminishing returns. Gold et al., 1996) .
If society chooses to consume at point C t *, C t+1 * this presumably is a point on the highest attainable ISWF which must be tangent to the IPPF. At this point the slope of the ISWF and IPPF are equal and STPR must be equal to the marginal rate of return (so cs rr ). Therefore, STPR can be estimated directly from the sum of its elements or inferred from observed rates of return (Gold et al., 1996) . For example, the UK Treasury has stipulated 3.5 per cent as the "standard real discount rate" for public sector investment appraisal (HM Treasury, 2003) based on the sum of the three elements: a pure time preference rate of 0.5%, a catastrophic risk premium of 1%, and 2% to represent the combined effect of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and the growth in per capita consumption. Alternatively, STPR could be inferred by observing s r , the rate at which the higher authority (government) can save or borrow. If markets are complete and undistorted, and the higher authority that allocates budget is regarded as a safe investment, then sc rr , which would be equivalent to the real yield on a bond issued by the higher authority in period t which matures in period 1 t .
However, where distortions exist, for example uncorrected negative externalities or corporate taxation, then observed market rates will tend to be higher than s r (Pearce and Nash, 1981) .
Similarly, where there are effects on future generations capital markets may be incomplete and observed rates will tend to be higher than the social opportunity cost of capital (Dasgupta et al., 1999) . For the purposes of the remaining discussion we denote s r as the rate at which the higher authority that allocates resources is able to borrow or invest and initially assume that markets are complete and undistorted so that s r also represents the social opportunity cost of capital ( sc rr ).
The rate of time preference for health A welfarist prescription
Traditionally economic analysis is more ambitious than the social decision making perspective described earlier, claiming to make statements about social welfare and prescribing social choice rather than simply informing decisions made by an agent with devolved and narrowly defined responsibilities (Mishan, 1967; Boadway and Bruce, 1984) . This requires a particular view of social welfare, commonly resting on individual preferences revealed through choices that individuals make (especially in markets) or modified by specification of an explicit social welfare function which will have consumption as well as health as its arguments. Since both consumption and health enter the social welfare function it provides a clear link between the social time preference rate for consumption, c r , and the social time preference rate for health, h r (Gravelle and Smith, 2001 ).
If consumption and health are either the only social arguments or they are separable from all other arguments of social value then decisions which maximise the consumption value of health will also maximise social welfare (Gravelle et al., 2007) . A decision based on net health benefits in (1) can be extended to express the consumption value of net health gains. The technology should be accepted if:
where the consumption value of health in period t (v t ) is the amount of consumption in period t that is equivalent to 1 unit of health in period t and t h and t c are both discounted at a common rate of c r .
This can also be expressed as a comparison of the ICER to the current cost effectiveness threshold (Claxton et al., in submission 
reflecting both growth in the consumption value of future health forgone and any changes in the rate at which future health will be forgone ( k g ). Therefore, the traditional approach to economic analysis provides a clear prescription for the social rate of time preference for health, and its relationship to the rate of time preference for consumption:
However, the clear prescription that g . Even if a particular consumption value of health could be agreed, the social welfare function it presupposes is unlikely to be complete and capture everything of social value. Nor is it likely to be carrying some broad consensus or social legitimacy, particularly when considering decisions with direct health impacts. In this case it implies that health and consumption are the only arguments of social value, or that they are separable from other arguments (e.g. education, equity, social solidarity, etc.) in some more complete description of social welfare. Adopting an incomplete description will lead to prescriptions which conflict with other legitimate objectives of social policy and other social arguments which -although difficult to formalise -may be important (e.g. widely held notions of social justice, intertemporal health equity, etc.). For example, observing 0 v g would suggest that greater social weight should be given to health gains for future patients, even though they are expected to enjoy more health, for no other reason than they are expected to have higher incomes and consume more than current patients. This might be regarded as a socially unacceptable conflict with equity concerns and widely held notions that access to health care should not be based on income but on capacity to benefit.
Furthermore, under this prescription, the budget allocation decisions made by a socially legitimate higher authority have no normative significance whatsoever. Indeed, it is t v alone which expresses social value. The budget constraint and the implied value of t k is not a legitimate expression of social value. Rather, the higher authority"s budget allocation is simply a nuisance, an inefficiency which prevents the maximisation of (this particular definition of) social welfare -unless by chance 4 Using the plausible assumptions that 
Budget allocation and the revealed social rate of time preference for health 7 tt vk and the budget is regarded as "optimal" with respect to the presupposed welfare function. In short, it requires the imposition of a particular social welfare function, which will not be universally acceptable or even likely to carry some broad social consensus (Arrow, 1950; Sen, 1970) , but nevertheless can stand above legitimate social democratic processes.
A social decision making approach
In contrast, the more modest social decision making perspective described earlier regards the value t k as a revealed partial expression of the value society places on health generated by collectively funded health care. Similarly, a partial but legitimate expression of the social time preference rate for health (generated by collectively funded health care) is also revealed by the allocation of budgets over time. A simple two period model is used to graphically illustrate this in Figure 3 . It demonstrates that 
Budget allocation
The higher authority"s choice in allocating total resources between two periods is illustrated in bold in the south west quadrant of Figure 3 . The total resources of * B available at the start of period t must be fully allocated between the two periods, so for each possible choice of budget in period t, Figure 3 .
Production functions for health
The relationship between budget allocated in each period and health output in each period is represented by the health production functions in the south east and north west quadrants. In each period the state of technology and input prices can be regarded as fixed, however, just as in Figure 1 , 1 t H is drawn to represent a health care system that is more productive in the next period, e.g. due to innovation in medicine.
allocation choices between periods, the higher authority determines health output in both periods and in turn the respective thresholds.
Intertemporal health production possibility frontier
Each unique budget allocation described in the south west quadrant is, through the production functions described in the south east and north west quadrants, associated with a combination of health outputs in each period in the north east quadrant. The combinations of represents the rate at which current health output can be transformed into future health through budget reallocation. The health production possibilities are determined by the productivity of the health care system in each period. The choice for the higher authority is where to locate on the IHPPF by allocating health budgets over each period.
Figure 3. Budget allocation and time preference for health

Revealed social time preference for health
By allocating budget between periods the higher authority in effect chooses a point on the IHPPF. It is reasonable to suppose that this point is regarded as socially preferred to other possible points that could have been chosen by allocating the budget in a different way. Therefore, the slope of the IHPPF at this point not only represents how current health can be transformed into future health but also reveals the rate at which the higher authority is willing to trade current for future health, i.e. an expression of social time preference for health. This expression is only partial in the sense that a complete intertemporal social welfare function cannot be specified and there will be many other arguments of social value at play when budget allocations are made. Therefore, although the dotted line in the north east quadrant suggests an indifference curve with common properties, it remains unknown. The things that can be reasonably known are t B , The relationship between the revealed social rate of time preference for health, the rate at which the higher authority can borrow and invest and the growth in the cost effectiveness threshold can be 
and the discount rate applied to t c from (4) 
It should be noted that where
, so differential discounting of costs and health effects is only appropriate when there is expected to be growth in the cost-effectiveness threshold. If the UK Treasury rate of 3.5% is regarded as an appropriate estimate of the STPR and if markets are regarded as complete and undistorted (so sc rr ) then the current NICE policy of discounting costs and health effects at 3.5% will be appropriate if the cost-effectiveness threshold is expected to be constant over the period where there are incremental costs and health benefits associated with the technology in question.
Discussion
A social decision making perspective regards bodies such as NICE as the agents of a socially legitimate higher authority that allocates budget to the health care system. Estimates of In addition, an instruction from the higher authority as to the rate at which it can borrow or invest when allocating resources, s r , is also needed. However, the social rate of time preference for health is not a choice that the agent can or should make. Rather, just like the cost-effectiveness threshold, it is revealed through budget allocation decisions. Therefore, not only is and health effects at 3.5% would be correct if the current UK Treasury estimate of the STPR is deemed appropriate. However, there are good reasons to suppose that this rate is too high. Aside from the difficulty of basing STPR on dubious estimates of each of its 3 elements, a real rate of return of 3.5% far exceeds observed marginal rates of return -even before any adjustments are made for distortions (e.g. environmental externalities or intergenerational effects), which would be required to estimate a social opportunity cost of capital. Importantly, from a social decision making perspective, a real rate of 3.5% is far in excess of current real yields on UK government bonds -as of 30 September However, this assumes that an explicit and complete welfare function can be specified which both describes social choice and how it is mediated through the social democratic process, i.e. precisely what the social decision making approach assumes is not possible. Alternatively, it is possible to simply define vk gg by assuming that the only expression of the value of health is the cost- Whether or not the threshold has been growing or is expected to grow over relevant time horizons is, in principle at least, an empirical question (Martin et al., 2008) . Simply observing real growth in the budget for health care, however, is not sufficient evidence for 0 k g . It will also depend on improvements in the productivity of health care and whether any increased expenditure is discretionary and "displaceable" by NICE guidance. Over recent years much of the real budget growth in the UK NHS has been devoted to national initiatives that are not easily displaced, e.g. new contracts for General Practitioners and consultants, national waiting time targets, information technology initiatives, etc. It also includes the guidance issued by NICE itself, which is mandatory. Therefore, any real growth in what remains will have been much more modest and more likely to be offset by growth in the productivity of displaceable activities, e.g. drugs, devices, procedures and other services. Similarly, although there has been a general rise in input prices for the UK NHS, much of this inflation has been driven by staff as well as capital and overhead costs, a great deal of which cannot easily be displaced. What are more relevant are the prices of inputs which could be displaced, an important element of which is drug prices. Although branded drug prices have tended to rise, at the same time there has been generic entry on patent expiry with dramatic reductions in prices (Office of Fair Trading, 2007) . As such, it is not self evident that the threshold has grown over recent years, despite real increases in the budget for health care; in any case, growth in the threshold seems much less likely in the future with the prospect of reduced budget growth, increased pressures to improve productivity and downward pressure on input prices.
Under a social decision making perspective, the allocation of budget illustrated in Figure 3 is not, and cannot, be assumed to be "optimal". To make claims about the optimality or otherwise of budgets poses the question: "optimal" with respect to what? The "what" can only be some complete (or at least separable) description of social welfare. However, the premise of a social decision making perspective is that a complete, explicit and legitimate expression of social welfare is not possible. If that premise is acceptable (it quite reasonably may not be) then all else seems to follow. All that can be said is that the budgets are allocated by a legitimate social process which is tasked with balancing ever-changing competing and contradictory claims on resources and conflicting social objectives. Therefore, the budgets allocated by this process, including allocations between sectors other than health, will not generally appear "optimal" when compared with any specific social welfare function that might be specified. The implications within the health sector (the thresholds and the implied social rate of time preference for health) are revealed and legitimate, but can only be regarded as a partial expression of social value. In summary, it appears that both the welfarist and social decision making perspectives are internally consistent. What distinguishes them is the assumption -on which discounting and other policy questions turn -of whether a complete, explicit and legitimate expression of social welfare is possible.
